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Although there was a dearth of activity in the area of the Texas
inheritance tax,' Findley v. Calvert2 was a case of first impression in constru-
ing the "contemplation of death" provision.3 In Findley the decedent had
conveyed his community property interest in certain real estate to his wife
some seven months prior to his death. The real estate interest transferred
was valued at $15,375.00, while the decedent's gross estate was valued at
$248,367.94. Presumably, the valuation of the gross estate did not include
the gift of real property. This gift was found to be in contemplation of death,
and thus includable in the decedent's gross estate, both by the hearings divi-
sion of the comptroller's office, 4 and by the district court in a non-jury trial.
The affirmance by the court of civil appeals, unfortunately, was a decision
lacking in clarity. Apparently, this gift satisfied the statutory presumption be-
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas at Austin; LL.M., Southern Methodist Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Fort Worth, Texas; Lecturer, Southern Methodist University
School of Law.
1. In one case the hearings division of the comptroller's office had to construe a
signature card signed by the decedent and the decedent's sister, which provided, in part:
"To provide for the contingency arising from the death of any joint depositor, each suchjoint depositor does hereby appoint each one of the other joint depositors to collect all
or any part of such joint deposit; and all payment made by said bank as herein autho-
rized shall be binding on all persons concerned .... ." 8 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWS-
LETTER OF SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1974, at 6. The hearings examiner held
that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship account was not created because the words
"payable to the survivor" or words of a similar import were not included on the signature
card. See Forehand v. Light, 452 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1970). Thus, these funds passed
by intestacy, rather than by right of survivorship, to the decedent's sister and were taxed
accordingly. 8 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct.
1974, at 6. This decision reiterates the principal that state substantive law will deter-
mine a decedent's ownership rights and the state tax laws will then determine the tax
effects of those ownership rights. A comparable rule is followed in federal tax matters.
See generally 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 61.01-.09 (1970);
Scharf, State Law in the Tax Court-Controlling Precedents, 26 TAX LAW. 293 (1973).
For a discussion of the federal tax aspects of this problem prior to the decision in Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), see Braverman & Gerson, The Con-
clusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation, 17 TAX L. REv. 545
(1962).
2. 509 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ).
3. On the date of decedent's death, the statute provided in part:
Any transfer made by a grantor . . . by deed . . . shall, unless shown to
the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death...
if such transfer is made within two (2) years prior to the death of the
grantor. . . of a material part of his estate, or if the transfer made within
such period is in the nature of a final distribution of property and with-
out adequate valuable consideration.
Ch. 1, § 1, [1959] Tex. Laws, 3d Spec. Sess. 324. The statute was subsequently amended,
but the only change was to increase the period of presumption to three years. TEx.
TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.01 (B) (Supp. 1974-75).
4. See 7 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Sept.
1973, at 14. The protest procedure is outlined in TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.032
(1969).
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cause it was both within the proper time limit and was also a "material" part
of the decedent's estate.5 Since the estate did not present sufficient evidence
to overcome this presumption, the gift was conclusively presumed to be in
contemplation of death and, thus, includable in the decedent's gross estate for
the purposes of Texas inheritance tax.
The court did not delineate any boundaries for the definition of a
"material" part of a decedent's estate. Based upon the court's reliance on
some early cases from other jurisdictions, however, it seems that the
$15,375.00 gift was "material" because it was a "large sum of money.",,
Equating the definition of a "material" part of the decedent's estate to mean
a "large sum of money" does nothing more than to require one to commence
the fruitless inquiry of "how big is big?" Although the test laid down by
the court for determining materiality is, at best, vague, the most disturbing
portion of the opinion is where the court states in dicta:
Appellant [Executrix of the estate] has based her case on the errone-
ous assumption that a transfer is not -taxable even though made in
contemplation of death unless the transfer is of a material part of the
estate. Thus we also agree with the conclusion of the Attorney Gen-
eral: 'Materiality is a factor which causes the presumption of taxability
to arise. It is not, per se, definitive of the state of mind of the donor,
nor the sine qua non of taxability.' 7
For a gift to be deemed in contemplation of death, it must be made within
three years of the decedent's death,8 and must be either: (1) a material part
of the estate, or (2) in the nature of a final distribution of assets.9 Thus,
5. For a discussion of some of the problems stemming from the use of "material-
ity" in determining gifts in contemplation of death, see generally Pavenstedt, Taxation
of Transfers in Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition, 54 YALE L.J. 70
(1944).
6. The court cited In re Stephenson's Estate, 171 Wis. 452, 177 N.W. 579, 582
(1920), showing that $23,000 was a material part of a $2,791,675 estate (.82%), and
Chase's Ex'x v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 471, 145 S.W.2d 58 (1940), showing that
$40,000 was a material part of the $649,000 estate (6.16%). But see In re Estate of
John C. Dillon, [1965-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH INH. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 20,368(1969), where a $24,040 gift of personalty, which was 12% of the gross estate and 15%
of the decedent's personalty, was held not to be a "material" part of the estate. Al-
though the court's rationale for finding the gift to be in contemplation of death in Find-
ley was the actual size of the gift, it is interesting to note the similarity in the relative
percentages that the gift in the Chase's case bears to the total estate (6.16%), with the
same ratio in the Findley case (6.19%). Certainly the prevailing economic conditions,
such as inflation, must be weighed in determining the inherent "materiality" of these
gifts.
7. 509 S.W.2d at 395. In the proceedings before the hearings division of the
comptroller's office, the estate argued that the $15,375 was not a material part of the
decedent's estate, but raised no question as to whether the transfer was in contemplation
of death. The hearings examiner simply held that the transfer was a material part of
the estate. 7 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETrER OF SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Sept.
1973, at 14.
8. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.01 (B) (1971).
9. There is an additional phrase following the test of determining if the gift is in
the nature of a final distribution, to-wit, "without adequate valuable consideration."
TEx. A'r'Y GEN. Op. No. V-264 (1947) concludes that this phrase is equally applicable
to a material transfer, so that a material gift could not be in contemplation of death
if it had adequate consideration to support its transfer. The conclusion of the attorney
general would seem correct. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 11 (1969); IA J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 21.14-.15 (D. Sands ed. 1972). See gener-
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even if the gift is made within the three-year statutory period, it must still
meet one of the tests set forth above before it will be presumed in contem-
plation of death. If the gift meets the necessary criteria, the estate can still
overcome this presumption by presenting sufficient evidence to show "life
motives" for the transfer. 10
If the quote attributed to the attorney general1' is considered by itself, the
two-prong test view of the contemplation of death provision is buttressed,
since the fact that the gift is material does not necessarily mean that it is
in contemplation of death. The estate still has the opportunity to prove
otherwise. Viewing the quote attributed to the attorney general in the con-
text of the court's opinion, however, leads to the necessary inference that a
gift can be in contemplation of death, even though it is not a material part
of the estate, nor in the nature of a final distribution of assets.12  It is sub-
mitted that this construction of the statute is erroneous, and since these state-
ments were made in dicta, they should be treated accordingiy.' 3
ally Kirk, Legal Drafting: The Ambiguity of "And" and "Or," 2 TEx. TEcH L. REV.
235 (1971).Query: What would the effect of partial consideration be on a material transfer under
this theory? Assume that a gift of $100 is material; however, the $100 gift is made
in consideration of the transfer of $90 to the donor. Assume further that a $10 gift
is not material. Has the partial consideration transformed a material gift into a non-
material gift?
10. From TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. Nos. 0-6678 (1945), V-264 (1947), it seems clear
that the dominant motive test of United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931), is to be
used in determining whether a transfer meeting the "objective" requirements of the stat-
ute is to be deemed in contemplation of death. See G. MAHANY, TEXAS TAXES § 32.19(1946); Comptroller's Ruling No. 30-0.05, [TEXAS] CCH INH. EST. & GIFT TAX REP.
1550 (1973); cf. Barry, The Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 10
HASTINGS L.J. 370 (1959). The court in Wells stated the test as follows:
It is contemplation of death, not necessarily contemplation of imminent
death, to which the statute refers. . . . Old age may give premonitions
and promptings independent of mortal disease. Yet age in itself cannot
be regarded as furnishing a decisive test, for sound health and purposes as-
sociated with life, rather than with death, may motivate the transfer. The
words 'in contemplation of death' mean that the thought of death is the
impelling cause of the transfer, and while the belief in the imminence of
death may afford convincing evidence, the statute is not to be limited, and
its purpose thwarted, by a rule of construction which in place of contem-
plation of death makes the final criterion to be an apprehension that death
is 'near at hand.'
283 U.S. at 117-18.
11. The language attributed to the attorney general by the court is not found in TEx.
ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-6678 (1945) nor in TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. V-264 (1947).
The author was unable to find any other opinion which contained this language.
12. Quite possibly the court was swayed by TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-6,678(1945). In that opinion, even though certain gifts were found not to be a material part
of the decedent's estate or in the nature of a final distribution, the attorney general went
on to consider: "Whether, regardless of the amount involved, these gifts were made 'in
contemplation of death'....." Earlier in this same opinion, the attorney general stated
the inquiry as follows: "[In this opinion it is necessary to determine whether the gifts
made by the decedent . . . were (1) a material part of his estate or in the nature of
a final distribution, and (2) whether the facts sufficiently overcome the presumption that
they were made in contemplation of death."
13. The two-pronged test is clearly sanctioned by Tax. ATT'y GEN. Op. No. V-264(1947), and by the commentators. Payne, State Inheritance and Estate Tax Considera-
tions in Estate Planning, in TEXAS INsTrrtuTEs 8T ANN. TAX CONF. 79, 96 (1960);
Comment, Some Problems of Texas Inheritance Taxation: Part 1I, 15 BAYLOR L. REv.





Amid little other activity in this area, 14 the allocation formula used to de-
termine the amount of franchise taxes for an interstate corporation was in
the limelight during the past year.15 Under article 12.02,16 a corporation
doing business in Texas determines its franchise taxes on the basis of a for-
mula using the corporation's total gross business receipts from both within and
without the state of Texas. In Calvert v. Electro-Science Investors, Inc.17
the court construed that portion of the statute which defines "total gross
receipts of the corporation from its entire business" to include, inter alia,
14. In one case the hearings division of the comptroller's office was asked to deter-
mine whether a credit union's subsidiary corporation was exempt from the franchise tax.
8 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1974,
at 5. It seemed that the subsidiary corporation performed services similar to those per-
formed by a bank trust department, and for this reason argued that it should be exempt
from the franchise tax. In holding that the subsidiary corporation was not exempt, the
hearings examiner noted that an exemption for state banks wa not derived from TEX.
TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.03 (1969), but rather is derived from TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art 342-908 (1973) of the Texas Banking Code, which provides in part: "[Sitate
banks and private banks shall be subjected to only such taxes . . . as could lawfully be
imposed upon such state banks or private banks were they operating as national banks."
Since the subsidiary corporation was not organized under the Texas Banking Code and
did not prove that it was a national or private bank, it was not exempt.
One additional case, Hoover v. Barker, 507 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), peripherally touched upon the franchise tax statute in holding
that a creditor of a corporation, which debtor corporation could not defend or prosecute
a lawsuit due to the forfeiture of its right to do business for failure to pay franchise
taxes, could sue the assignee who had purchased all of the corporation's assets, and had
assumed its liabilities. Thus, the assignee's plea in abatement based on the forfeiture
of the assignor corporation's right to do business was overruled. Cf. Acme Color Art
Printing Co. v. Brown, 488 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
reviewed in Tracy, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 340, 343-44
(1974).
15. For an introduction into the use of allocation formulas, see generally W. BEA-
MAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 15.1-.8 (1963).
16. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12,02(l)(a) (1969) provides that a corporation cal-
culates the Texas franchise tax by multiplying its taxable capital by the percentage
"which the gross receipts from its business done in Texas bear to the total gross receipts
of the corporation from its entire business." The allocation formula can be expressed
as follows:
Texas Gross
Franchise _ Taxable Receipts x Rate of
Tax - Capital X Entire Gross Tax
Receipts
The term "taxable capital" includes the corporation's stated capital, surplus, and undi-
vided profits. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.01(1) (a) (i) (1969). Stated capital is
basically the par value or actual consideration for a corporation's stock, Comptroller's
Ruling No. 80-0.08, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 15,721 (1966), while surplus and un-
divided profits includes all surplus items which are defined in TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 1.02(12) (1956) as "the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its
stated capital." Comptroller's Ruling No. 80-0.09, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 15,723
(1966). For the purposes of the allocation formula, taxable capital includes the cor-
poration's stated capital, surplus and undivided profits wherever located. Ford Motor
Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
If the allocation formula of TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(1) (1969) does not
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business done in Texas, it may petition the
comptroller to take other factors into consideration. See Comptroller's Ruling No. 80-
0.17, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 15,744 (1966); Lane, Recent Changes in Texas Fran-
chise Tax Law, 5 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No.
2, July 1972, at 6-8. The Texas allocation is criticized in 5 Hous. L. REV. 132 (1967).
17. 509 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
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"only the net gain from" the sale of "investments and capital assets."' s The
comptroller argued that the phrase "net gain" in article 12.02(1)(d) referred
only to gain, so that entire gross receipts would include only the gain from
these assets, with no reduction for any losses. Losses would, however,
reduce taxable capital, since they would be a reduction of surplus. 19 On the
other hand, the taxpayer argued that the phrase "net gain" means the netting
of gains and losses during the course of the year. Accordingly, losses from
the investment type assets would reduce not only the amount of entire gross
receipts, but, also, would necessarily reduce the amount of taxable capital.
Quite logically, the court accepted the taxpayer's construction of the appli-
cable statutory language. 'However, the decision is quite interesting, for it
would appear that the taxpayer would pay more franchise taxes by the
court's decision (i.e., the taxpayer's own argument) than by adhering to the
comptroller's view of the statute. This follows from the holding that the en-
tire gross receipts includes only net gain as opposed to gross gain from the
designated assets.
It is axiomatic that a fractional ratio decreases as the denominator of the
fraction increases, if all other variables in the equation remain constant.
Assuming that the taxable capital, Texas gross receipts, and rate of tax com-
ponents of the equation will all remain constant,20 the comptroller's use of
gross receipts from investment assets will cause the denominator of the frac-
tion to be larger than by using the taxpayer's argument of including only net
receipts as an addition to the denominator. Thus, mathematically, the comp-
troller's argument (by increasing the denominator of the fraction in the
allocation formula) decreases the fraction, so that less taxable capital is
available on which to calculate the rate of tax. The rationale for this very
unique situation may arise from the assumption by the comptroller, the tax-
payer, and the court that since only net gains were included in the denomina-
tor of the fraction, it must necessarily follow that only net gains were also
used in determining Texas gross receipts, i.e., the numerator of the fraction.
Naturally, decreasing the numerator (which would follow the taxpayer's argu-
ment) also decreases the fraction and, consequently, the taxable capital
which is subject to the franchise tax.21 It is submitted, however, that if this
18. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(1)(d) (1969) provides that the term "total
gross receipts from its entire business" includes "as to the sale of investments and capital
assets . . . only the net gain from such sales."
19. Losses will automatically reduce the amount of taxable capital, as that amount
is included by definition in surplus. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.01(1)(a)(i) (1969);
Comptroller's Ruling No. 80-0.09, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 15,723 (1966).
20. There is no question but that the rate of tax would remain a constant, as would
taxable capital. See notes 16, 19 supra. Likewise, Texas gross receipts must remain
constant, since viewing the court's decision literally, only the entire gross receipts por-
tion of the fraction (the denominator) was under scrutiny by the court and not the
Texas gross receipts portion (the numerator of the fraction). But see the textual dis-
cussion accompanying notes 21, 22 infra.
21. This can be inferred from the court's statement of the comptroller's argument
as follows: "[The Comptroller] argue[s] that Article 12.02(1)(d) was designed to ac-
curately represent the amount of business done in Texas; that the Comptroller's inter-
pretation is correct because it is the most accurate representation of the extent of the
corporate taxpayers' business in the state . . . ." 509 S.W.2d at 701. This explanation
of the decision gains greater feasibility when the facts are added that the Electro-Science
[Vol. 29
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were the court's implication, it was in error. The court construed article
12.02(1)(d) defining "total gross receipts of the corporation from its entire
business" and not article 12.02(1)(b) defining "gross receipts from its
business done in Texas." The added definition concerning the sale of capital
and investment assets is not found in article 12.02(1)(b). Further, in con-
struing the predecessor statute to article 12.02, the courts have held that
"gross receipts" means gross and not net receipts. 22
The only other franchise tax decision, Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert,23
presented a unique decision of statutory construction. Article 12.20 provides
an additional franchise tax for those corporations filing franchise tax returns
"for the preceding fiscal year as shown in the report . . . filed . . . between
January 1 and May 1, 1971 (or the initial or first year report required to
be filed . ... )-"24 The legislature in drafting the statute apparently over-
looked the 1969 amendment to article 12.08 which changed the period
during which a corporation must file a franchise tax return from "between
January 1st and May lst" to "between January 1st and June 15th."'25  In
response to the comptroller's argument that the additional franchise tax was
applicable to all "regular" corporations and that the legislative intent was.to
tax these corporations, the court stated:
Article 12.20 is clear and unambiguous and leaves no room for con-
struction. Its plain terms apply only to those corporations required to
file a franchise tax report between January 1 and May 1, 1971, and
thus does not apply to those corporations which were not required to
file the report until June 15, 1971. -In addition, appellants were not
required to pay a franchise tax 'for the preceding fiscal year' but were
required to pay a franchise tax under Article 12.01 as described above. 26
Under the court's construction of the statute only corporations filing an initial
or first year franchise tax report between January 1 and May 1, 1971, would
'be subject ,to the additional franchise tax. Since all other corporations would
be required to file their return between January 1 and June 15, 1971, they
would not be members of the class of corporations subject to article 12.20.
Investors corporation regularly invested its assets in or made loans to small businesses
in the electronics field. It seems that the main source of the corporation's income was
through the sale of securities or from the interest and dividends on those securities. 8
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1974, at
4-5.
22. Steakley v. West Tex. Gulf Pipe Line Co., 336 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1960, no writ). But see TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. S-212 (1956) which states
that sale of capital assets where no gain is produced does not create any "gross receipts."
23. 510 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ granted).
24. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.20(1) (Supp. 1974-75), which expired April 30,
1972. Compare TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.211 (Supp. 1974-75) imposing the addi.
tional franchise tax after May 1, 1972, which makes no reference to when the franchise
tax return is filed.
25. TEx. Tsx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.08(1) (1969).
26. 510 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ granted). The lan-
guage in the quoted material regarding the fact that the taxpayer corporation did not
pay a franchise tax for the "preceding fiscal year" but did pay a tax "under Article
12.01" undoubtedly refers to the fact that after filing the initial return, the 'franchise
tax is paid in advance, even though calculated on the basis of the corporation's books
at the end of the prior fiscal year of the corporation.
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It might well be that even the "regular" corporations which paid the
additional franchise tax might be entitled to a refund.2 1
Since the Texas Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in the Texas
Pipe Line case, the state has another opportunity to plead its case. Contrary
to the view of the court of civil appeals, it is the author's opinion that the
Texas Supreme Court might hold article 12.20 applicable to all "regular" cor-
porations for several reasons.28  First, the manifest legislative intent was to
include all corporations within the parameters of article 12.20. The use of
"May 1" instead of "June 15" in defining the period during which tax reports,
for corporations subject to the additional tax, are filed was mere inadvertence.
Secondly, article 12.20 must be construed in light of all provisions in chapter
12 of title 122A affecting franchise taxes. One such provision is article 12.08
requiring corporations to make a report and pay franchise taxes between
January 1 and June 15 of each year. The legislature changed "May 1" to
read "June 15" in 1969; consequently, the court may judicially read "May
1" in article 12.20 to read "June 15." Finally, the taxpayer was required
to file a franchise tax report between January 1 and May 1. The mere fact
that the report was not delinquent until June 15 does not obviate the respon-
sibility of the corporation to file the return during this period. Thus, the tax-
payer was a member of the class of corporations subject to the additional
franchise tax.*
III. SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act 29
Unless an exemption is available,30 the Texas sales tax is imposed upon
27. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.11A(2) (1969) provides in part: "When the
Comptroller determines that any . . . corporation has through mistake of law or fact
overpaid the amount due the State . . . [for franchise taxes] . . . the Comptroller may
refund such overpayment . . . from funds appropriated for such purpose." (Emphasis
added.) The comptroller is precluded from making such refunds so long as a suit re-
garding the taxes is pending. Thus, the refund can be made during the course of admin-
istrative proceedings following payment of the tax and protest, or even after a suit con-
cerning the taxes is dismissed. TEx. Arr'Y GEN. OP. No. M-996 (1971).
28. This is especially true in light of the statement by one commentator that the
refund of the additional franchise taxes might cause such a depletion in state funds that
a special session of the legislature would be needed to make additional appropriations.
Lane, supra note 16, at 5-6.
* Editor's Note: Since this Article went to press, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals. 517 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1974).
29. A general introduction into the field of state sales taxes can be found in J. DUE,
STATE SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION (1963); D. MORGAN, RETAIL SALES TAX (1964).
Additionally, the comptroller in response to questions propounded to him has provided
some enlightening responses to the application of the use tax to out-of-state sellers. P-H
STATE & LOCAL TAXES 23,054 (1974).
30. One of the exemptions is the occasional sale of taxable items. TEX. TAx.-GEN.
ANN. art. 20.04(I) (1969). An "occasional sale" includes, inter alia, the "sale of the
entire operating assets of a business." TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(F) (2) (1969).
The hearings division of the comptroller's office recently construed this provision in a
case where all of the assets of an automobile dealership were sold except for accounts
receivable. 8 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No.
1, Oct. 1974, at 5. The hearings examiner held that this qualified as an occasional sale
because the sales tax was intended to be levied upon tangible personal property. Ac-
counts receivable, being intangible property, were not intended to be included within the
definition of "operating assets of a business." It is interesting to note in the two cases
concerning the bulk sale of a business that it is unclear from the opinions whether the
seller had accounts receivable on its books and, if so, whether the buyer purchased them.
[Vol. 29
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the retail sale of all tangible personal property.31 The retailer is required
to collect from the consumer and remit to the comptroller the appropriate
tax. If a retailer becomes delinquent in remitting the sales tax or applies for
a new sales tax permit after January 1, 1974, he must provide the comptroller
with a bond or other security to guarantee payment of -the tax.32
A government contractor recently came under scrutiny in Calvert v. Day
& Zimmerman, Inc.3 3 The taxpayer in this case assembled and packaged on
a military base ammunition solely for the Government on a "cost plus award
fee" basis. The purchase order used by the taxpayer clearly specified that
the sale was between the taxpayer and the vendor of the goods and not be-
tween the vendor and the United States. As a practical matter, however,
title to the goods passed to the United States upon receipt and inspection by
the taxpayer, unless a government purchasing agent refused to accept the
goods. In finding the taxpayer liable for sales taxes upon the goods that it
purchased, the court based its decision upon a finding that the taxpayer was
an independent contractor, as opposed to an agent for the United States Gov-
ernment. Naturally, if the taxpayer were an agent for the United States, no
sales taxes would be due.34 However, it would seem that the characterization
Calvert v. Marathon Oil Co., 389 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Calvert v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 388 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The purchaser would, however, be liable for any sales taxes
due and owing by the seller. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.09(l) (1969); Comptroller's
Ruling No. 95-0.45, 1 CCH TEX. STATE TAX REP. 63-030a (1969); see also 6 STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 2, April 1973, at 10-
11, § 7.
31. Recently, TEx. ATrr' GEN. Op. No. H-303 (1974) held that the sale of state
owned marl, sand, gravel, and shell by the Parks and Wildlife Department, as authorized
by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4053(d) (1966), is subject to the Limited Sales, Ex-
cise and Use Tax Act. It should be noted here that the exemption for governmental
agencies provided by TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(H) (1969) applies only when the
sale is "to" and not "by" the agency. Comptroller's Ruling No. 95-0.35, 1 CCH TEX.
STATE TAX REP. 60-236 (1972).
Another attorney general opinion, TEX. ATr'Y GEN. O'. No. H-247 (1974), con-
cerned the determination of whether service gratuities, i.e., "tips," constituted a portion
of the sales price for the taxable sale of food by a restaurant. In this unusual opinion
the attorney general held that service gratuities, even if collected by the employer, are
not taxable unless the employer receives some benefit from them, e.g., the gratuities are
credited against the employer's payment of minimum wages. The opinion concludes that
the definition of "sales price" in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(L)(2)(a) (1969) to
include any "services which are a part of the sale" requires the inclusion of the gratuities
when credited against the minimum wage because, in the attorney general's view, "the
employer derives a very definite benefit" therefrom. In the author's opinion, the rea-
soning of the attorney general is faulty because the customer pays the same price for
his food whether or not he is gracious enough to tip the waitress. The fact that the
gratuity may or may not give some benefit to the employer is irrelevant for the purposes
of computing the sales tax upon tangible personal property. There is certainly no at-
tempt to deduct the "labor cost" of the waitress from the sales price of the food sold.
32. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.021(N) (Supp. 1974-75); Comptroller's Ruling
No. 95-0.46, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 21,584 (1974). The attorney general has
held that the comptroller may, but is not required to, accept a bond written by a surety
not authorized to engage in business in Texas. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-378(1974). Additionally, both governmental agencies and private individuals selling tax-
able items on government property must furnish the required bond. TEX. ATr'y GEN.
Op. No. H-424 (1974).
33. 504 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ granted).
34. Governmental agencies are exempt from the sales tax. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN.




of taxpayer as an independent contractor does not provide a satisfactory
rationale for the court's decision. If the taxpayer were a "lump sum contrac-
tor," i.e., completing work on a flat fee basis for both materials and labor,
it would be required to pay sales taxes on the materials which it purchased.
However, the lump sum contractor provisions apply only when personal prop-
erty is incorporated into realty,"5 which, apparently, is not the case here.
Additionally, it would seem that several arguments are available to the tax-
payer in its appeal to the Texas Supreme Court to deny taxability. First,
the materials purchased by the taxpayer are used in the process of manufac-
turing other items of tangible personal property. 3a6 Second, due to the "cost
plus" nature of the taxpayer's contract with the government, the items of per-
sonal property are being purchased for the purpose of resale and are, thus,
exempt.8 7 In the author's opinion, the supreme court might well use one of
these arguments to find the sales tax inapplicable to the taxpayer. The effect
of such a decision would be that no sales tax would be due, since the tax-
payer's gross receipts from sales to the United States Government would be
exempt. 8 *
Richardson Construction Co. v. Calvert,8 9 presented a case of first impres-
sion construing article 20.04(V), which provides, inter alia, for an exemption
for receipts from the "lease or rental of . . .an interest in tangible personal
property to a partner, co-owner or other person who before or after such a
[lease or rental] owns a joint or undivided interest (with the seller) in such
tangible personal property .... -40 In Richardson a partnership leased cer-
tain tangible personal property to a corporation which was under common
control with the partnership. The court quite reasonably held that article
20.04(V) did not provide an exemption for this lease transaction because
35. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(T) (1969); Comptroller's Ruling No. 95-0.09,
P-H STATE & LoCAL TAXES 21,516 (1971); cf. Able Irrigation Co. v. Calvert, 495
S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ).
36. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.01(U), 20.04(E) (1969); see Comptroller's Rul-
ing No. 95-0.16, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 21,530 (1973). However, a taxable use
of the property would be a break in the "train of progression" toward ultimate resale, so
that sales taxes on such property would then be due. See 8 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWS-
LETrER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1974, at 5-6.
37. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(0) (1969); see Comptroller's Ruling No. 95-
0.05, P-H STATE & LocAL TAxEs 21,508 (1974). It is interesting to note that the
comptroller is attempting to collect the tax from the purchaser, i.e., the taxpayer, rather
than the seller, which may indicate that the comptroller's theory of recovery is predi-
cated upon the use tax, rather than the sales tax. The use tax, which is the complement
of the sales tax, provides that the taxes imposed "on the storage, use and other consump-
tion in this state of taxable items purchased, leased or rented from any retailer for stor-
age, use or other consumption in this state . . ." shall be at the same rates prescribed
on the sales price "or in the case of leases or rentals on said lease or rental prices."
TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.03 (1969). The use tax is collected by every retailer en-
gaged in business in the State of Texas, i.e., any retailer who has "any representative,
agent, salesman, canvasser or solicitor operating in this State under the authority of the
retailer . . . for the purpose of selling, delivering, or the taking of orders for any taxable
items." TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.031(B)(2) (1969).
38. See authorities cited in note 34 supra. If one of the exemptions described in
notes 316 and 37 supra is applicable, the comptroller would also be prevented from assert-
ing any use taxes against the taxpayer. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(A) (1969).
* Editor's Note: Since this Article went to press, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals. 519 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1975).
39. 509 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam,
518 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1974).
40. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(V) (1969).
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the corporation and the partnership did not jointly own the property which
was the subject matter of the lease. 41  It is hard to imagine any different
result under these facts.
B. Local Sales and Use Tax Act
Under the Local Sales and Use Tax Act, cities may impose a one percent
tax on all items taxable under the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act.42
The comptroller administers the Act and collects all receipts for the benefit
of the adopting cities. 43
One case of interest was presented in a recent attorney general opinion44
concerning -the availability of receipts under the Act to a defectively incor-
porated town. It seems that the town of Angus was purportedly incorporated
in 1972 with the governing body of the town adopting the Local Act. On
July 23, 1973, the district court of Navarro County declared the incorpora-
tion "illegal, void, and of no effect." Based upon this judgment, the attorney
general held that the incorporation of the town of Angus was void ab initio,
so that Angus never had the authority to adopt the Local Act. Thus, the
"purported" town having neither de jure nor de facto status was not
entitled to receive the sales taxes collected on its behalf by the comptroller.
A necessary corollary to the attorney general's opinion is that those persons
paying the additional sales tax to the town of Angus are entitled to a refund
under article 20.10.45 As a practical matter, however, these funds will prob-
ably revert to the state, for few, if any, taxpayers will make the required re-
fund claims, and those that do will doubtless be unable to meet the specificity
requirement for such claims. 46
C. Motor Vehicle Retail Sales and Use Tax
A sales tax is imposed upon the retail sale, rental,47 or lease 48 of a motor
41. Additional requirements for the joint ownership exemption are set out in Comp-
troller's Ruling No. 95-0.50, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 21,592 (1974).
42. The attorney general recently held that a "sale" of state owned marl, sand,
gravel and shell by the Parks and Wildlife Department occurs within the jurisdiction of
the city where these items are severed from the real estate for the purposes of the Local
Act. TEx. Ar'Y GEN. Op. No. H-303 (1974).
43. In fact, the comptroller is the sole agent for the collection of these taxes. Thus,
if a city collects the taxes, in any manner, it must turn the tax receipts over to the comp-
troller for its own benefit. TEx. AT-r'Y GEN. OP. No. H-274 (1974). See generally
Howell, City Sales Taxes-The City Attorney's Dilemma, 6 STATE BAR OF TExAs,
NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1972, at 6.
44. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-332 (1974).
45. Tax. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.10 (1969).
46. Id. art. 20.10(C) provides: "Every claim shall be in writing and shall state the
specific grounds upon which the claim is founded." Apparently, under the facts pre-
sented, a taxpayer would not be entitled to a refund unless he could produce cash regis-
ter receipts evidencing payment of the tax in this situation.
47. A vehicle is held for rental if its exclusive use is to be given to another for a
consideration and for a period of time not exceeding 31 days under any one agreement.
TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.03(E) (Supp. 1974-75). See Comptroller's Ruling No. 40-0.14, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXEs 21,700 (1973). When a vehicle is purchased for
rental, no vehicle sales tax is due; rather, a tax is levied upon the gross rental reciepts
and must be collected by the owner from the renter. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.01(1)(Supp. 1974-75).
48. A vehicle is held for lease if its exclusive use is to be given to another for a
consideration and for a period of time exceeding 31 days. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art.
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vehicle in this state.49  When title to the motor vehicle is changed, an
affidavit signed by both the seller and purchaser must be presented to the
county tax assessor-collector setting forth the consideration paid for the
vehicle."0 As a practical matter, the statute is self-regulating in the sense
that the assessor-collector is dependent upon these affidavits in collecting the
bulk of the taxes due under the Act.
A recent attorney general opinion5' provides an interesting insight into an
exemption from the motor vehicle sales tax for certain transactions on the
basis of a "no sale" theory.52 The facts underlying the opinion involved a
husband and wife who formed a partnership to engage in the trucking
business. They purchased trucks in the partnership name, paid a motor ve-
hicle sales tax, and two days later decided to incorporate the business. The
partnership was liquidated with the couple transferring partnership property,
including the trucks, to the new corporation in exchange for all of its stock.
Although there is no statutory exemption for such transfers, the attorney gen-
eral quite reasonably held that no motor vehicle sales tax is due on such trans-
fers, since they are merely the adoption of a new form of business without
a change in ownership, so long as the only consideration given in the
exchange is stock in the newly created corporation. This decision would not
6.03(F) (Supp. 1974-75). See Comptroller's Rulings Nos. 40-0.14, 40-0.15, P-H STATE
& LOCAL TAXES 21,700, 21,702 (1973). When a vehicle is purchased for lease, the
purchaser-lessor must pay a motor vehicle sales tax on the total consideration paid and
no tax will be due from the lessee. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.01(1) (Supp. 1974-75).49. Some recent attorney general opinions concerning the motor vehicle sales tax
include TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-381 (1974) (a motor vehicle sales tax is due on
the use of a vehicle owned by a car dealer for his personal use, or that of his family
or employees); TEX. Ar'Y GEN. Op. No. H-380 (1974) (a motor vehicle sales tax is
due on the conversion of a vehicle from rental to personal use or from rental to lease
use, but in this latter circumstance, the comptroller's regulations setting forth the only
method to determine "book value" of the vehicle for the purposes of determining the
tax is invalid); TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-380 (1974) (a motor vehicle sales tax can-
not be imposed on the rental of a vehicle to a federal employee acting on government
business and within the scope of his employment).
50. The attorney general considered, in several opinions, the affidavit required by
TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.05 (1969) to be furnished the county tax assessor-collector.
See generally Comptroller's Ruling No. 40-0.17, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 21,706
(1973). These opinions included TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-293 (1974) (tax asses-
sor-collector has no authority to require parties to a prior sale to pay taxes due but un-
paid on those sales, as he can only deny registration of vehicles if the sales taxes are
not paid; however, tax assessor-collector should notify comptroller of this fact so that
appropriate action can be taken); TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-174 (1973) (the tax as-
sessor-collector has no authority to refuse an affidavit on grounds that it may be false,
but should report his suspicions to the comptroller or district attorney for appropriate
action); and TEx. Ar'xY GEN. Op. No. H-173 (1973) (tax assessor-collector can refuse
affidavit where corporation is a party to the transaction and an authorized officer of
the corporation does not sign the required affidavit).
51. Tax. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-273 (1974).
52. The "no sale" theory has also found fruition in TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. S-
22 (1953) (a corporate merger where no consideration was involved due to joint owner-
ship of corporations); TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-6871 (1945) (a corporate dissolution
where vehicle distributed to shareholder represents a portion of the shareholder's inter-
ests in the corporate assets); Comptroller's Ruling No. 40-0.16, P-H STATE & LOCAL
TAXES 21,704 (1973) (creation of a subsidiary corporation by "spinning-off" assets
of the parent corporation). See also 6 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SEC-




be noteworthy but for the fact that the comptroller in his regulations, s8 and
an earlier attorney general opinion,54 reached a contrary result. Although
the opinion does not specifically so state, presumably these contrary views
are now overruled.
IV. AD VALOREM TAXES 5 5
There was the usual flurry of decisions relating to ad valorem taxes, most
of which are not of general interest. Included in this category were those
cases discussing the Legislative Property Tax Committee,56 exemption from
ad valorem taxation of property owned by charities or municipalities, 57
exemptions available for homesteads, s what constitutes land held for "agri-
53. Comptroller's Ruling No. 40-0.16, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXS 21,704 (1973)
provides, inter alia, that a motor vehicle sales tax is due:
1. On all transactions involving the transfer of motor vehicles to or
from corporations except [as described in note 52 supra] . . . 2. In an
instance where a corporation is in the formative stage of its organization,
any and all vehicles contributed by stockholders are subject to the Motor
Vehicle Sales Tax and the tax base will be the value of the stock issued in
exchange for the motor vehicle. 3. When two or more individuals or cor-
porations enter into a partnership or Joint Venture and transfer title to
motor vehicles into the assumed name of the new enterprise.
See also TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. C-764 (1966).
54. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. V-36 (1947).
55. For a critique of the Texas property tax system, see Yudof, The Property Tax
in Texas under State and Federal Law, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 885 (1973). See generally
G. MAHANY, TEXAS TAXES §§ 2.01-9.34 (1946); D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROP-
ERTY TAX (1966); STATE AND LOCAL TAX PROBLEMS (H. Johnson ed. 1969); Ladd, The
Role of the Property Tax: A Reassessment, in BROAD-BAsED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND
SouRcEs (R. Musgrave ed. 1973); Comment, Real Property Tax Assessment: A Look
at Its Administration Practices and Procedures, 38 ALAn'ANY L. Rav. 498 (1974).
56. TEX. ATr'y. GEN. Op. No. H-317 (1974) (Legislative Property Tax Committee
(LPTC) can require production of appraisal data from tax assessor-collector or private
appraisal firms); TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-258 (1974) (financial information relat-
ing to asset values gathered by LPTC during study of market values of property is public
information subject to disclosure under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Supp.
1974-75), the Open Records Act).
57. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-399 (1974) (dwelling furnished for minister of
music may qualify for tax exempt status, provided other requirements of TaEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. arts. 7150(1) (1960), and 7150b (Supp. 1974-75) are met); TEx. ATr'y
GEN. Op. No. H-342 (1974) (hospital will not lose its property tax exemption when
a portion of its premises are used by a blood bank, if: (a) the blood bank's operation
is incidental to that of the hospital, or (b) the blood bank is also a public charity, no
landlord-tenant relationship is created between the hospital and the blood bank, and no
rent is charged by the hospital); TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-316 (1974) (property
conveyed to Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority, a municipal corporation, for the pur-
pose of constructing facilities to treat industrial waste from five corporations is not ex-
empt from ad valorem taxes when the conveyance is so burdened with restrictions and
built in reversionary interests that it does not exclusively belong to the municipal cor-
poration); TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-315 (1974) (TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
7150, § 28 (Supp. 1974-75) exempting property held by non-profit corporations for use
in medical center developments is constitutional); TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-230
(1974) (under authority of City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge No. 731, A.F. & A.M.,
488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1972), San Benito Elks Lodge is held not to be exempt).
58. TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-364 (1974) (TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7329a
(Supp. 1974-75) postponing foreclosure for delinquent taxes on homesteads of persons
over age 65 is constitutional); TEX. ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. H-309 (1974) (when political
subdivision of state has approved additional exemption for those persons over age 65,
the homowner can obtain the benefit of this exemption even though he does not claim
it during the statutory exemption period); TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-162 (1973) (the
additional exemption for persons over age 65 is based upon the assessed value of the
homestead, cannot be varied during year in which it is established, can be changed or
modified prospectively, and is unlimited as to maximum amount, except to extent needed
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culture use" and, thus, subject to special tax assessments, 9 the procedure
used for assessing certain properties,6" and procedural aspects of ad valorem
tax collection. 61
A. Taxable Situs of Property62
In Nacogdoches Independent School Dist. v. McKinneye3 the Texas
Supreme Court was presented with the question of determining the taxable
situs of certain equipment used in McKinney's construction business. From
the facts, it was clear that McKinney's road building equipment was never
physically located within the jurisdiction of the Nacogdoches School District;
the equipment was maintained at various "field offices" from whence it was
to protect the pledged security for debt). See also Kahn v. Shevin, 516 U.S. 351 (1974)
(Florida statutes providing property tax exemption for "widows," but not for "widowers"
does not violate the equal protection clause).
59. San Marcos Consol. Ind. School Dist. v. Nance, 502 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1974)
(secondary and incidental lease of land for deer hunting does not deprive owner of spe-
cial tax assessment when property is otherwise devoted exclusively to "agriculture use").
60. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-370 (1974) (if personal property has become so
annexed to realty that it is a fixture, then it is to be taxed as a part of the realty and
cannot be taxed as personalty); TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-281 (1974) (taxation of
flight equipment on interstate air carriers based on miles traveled within Texas as com-
pared to miles traveled within and without Texas satisfies the commerce clause require-
ments of the United States Constitution, but may not meet the uniform and equal re-
quirements of the Texas Constitution because the formula does not tax idle "bridge time"
while the craft is stationary and, thus, 100% of value of the plane would not be taxed
by all taxing jurisdictions combined; whereas, solely intra-state carriers are taxed at
100% of their value). See also Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62
(1974) (Machines specially built for foreign customers, stored in warehouse for future
shipment, for which export license had not been issued and for which purchaser had not
yet paid were not "exports," as they had not yet entered "upon an actual movement into
the stream of export." Thus, the State of Ohio could assess ad valorem taxes against
this property.).
61. Brown v. City of Dallas, 508 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ) (to create a question of fact concerning taxable situs of personal property, the tax-
payer must allege specific facts in opposition to the taxing authorities' motion for a sum-
mary judgment); City of Bryan v. Texas Serv., Inc., 499 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (costs of suit for delinquent taxes may not be assessed
against city, even where taxpayer initiates declaratory judgment action and city brings
suit for taxes by way of a cross-claim); TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-339 (1974) (sur-
plus maintenance taxes of a school district may be pledged in payment of certificates
of indebtedness issued by district where election authorizing levy of maintenance funds
occurred before or after enactment of Tax. EDuc. CODE ANN. art. 20.51 (Supp. 1974-
75)); TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-335 (1974) (calculation of statutory attorney fees
for district attorney representing county and state in delinquent tax suits is based only
on amounts sued for by these entities and not on amounts sued for by other taxing au-
thorities, e.g., school district); Tax. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-230 (1974) (tax collector
cannot forgive interest and penalties on taxes not paid by San Benito Elks Lodge for
period of time during which Lodge, in good faith, considered itself exempt from ad
valorem taxation); TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-229 (1974) (when agriculture land is
converted into non-agriculture land, extra taxes included on basis of formula using
three prior years becomes due and payable, but penalties and interest begin to accrue
only from and after time taxpayer refuses to pay additional taxes).
62. Two additional "situs" cases during the survey period were Houston v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 504 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (incorporated town cannot assess ad valorem taxes against rolling stock of
a railroad, as statutory situs is fixed in counties only), and City of Bryan v. Texas Serv.,
Inc., 499 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e) (rent cars perma-
nently stationed at locations outside city acquire domicile for tax purposes at these loca-
tions, so that city in which company offices are located has no taxing power over the
vehicles).
63. 504 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1974).
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deployed to job sites; rarely did the equipment go from job to job without
first returning to the field office for checking and repair; and when not in
use, the equipment was stored at the various field offices. On the basis of
these facts, the supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals and held
that McKinney's road building equipment had obtained a tax situs outside
the Nacogdoches Independent School District and, thus, the district was with-
out jurisdiction to levy a tax on this equipment. 64 Although the supreme
court's decision in McKinney is correct, a slight shift in the facts could cause
the common law rule of mobilia sequuntur personam (personalty is taxable
at the domicile of its owner, regardless of its actual location) to apply. Thus,
if the road building equipment is constantly moved from place to place on
different job sites and never acquires an actual situs at any such locations,
the equipment would be taxable at the domicile of the owner of the
property. 65 In this latter circumstance, the jurisdictions in which the person-
alty was located would be unable to assess any ad valorem taxes against the
property.
B. Taxpayer Remedies6"
Many times a taxpayer will feel aggrieved by a plan of taxation instituted
by a taxing authority and will seek, in some manner, to rectify what he con-
siders to be an unfair system of taxation. Swamp Irish, Inc. v. Snow67 was
concerned with just such a situation and shows graphically the taxpayer's
problems in these types of suits. In Swamp Irish the taxpayer pleaded, in
broad terms, that certain personalty was not included in the tax rolls. Thus,
the tax rate necessary to raise a given amount of revenue was higher than
if the omitted property had been included, thereby causing the taxpayer to
pay more in ad valorem taxes than he would otherwise be required to pay.
The decision is not noteworthy for its specific holding that the taxpayer failed
to have the necessary pleadings to withstand a motion for summary judgment
by the defendant taxing authority, but rather is very instructive in detailing
the availability of the remedy of mandamus and injunctive relief.
The taxpayer had sought mandamus and injunctive relief to require the
inclusion on the tax rolls of certain omitted personalty. This relief is avail-
able to the taxpayer only if suit is filed prior to the tax plan's being put into
effect, and even then the taxpayer must
not only allege and prove that certain classes of personal property were
omitted from the tax rolls and that such omission resulted in substan-
64. The court also affirmed the court of civil appeals decision that on similar facts,
McKinney's partnerships were separate legal entities having their domiciles in Waco and
Saner so that the Nacogdoches School District was without jurisdiction to tax the property
of these businesses. Id. at 834.
65. Lawson v. City of Groves, 487 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972,
no writ); TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-3702 (1941).
66. A relatively unimportant recent decision was Florence v. Asherton Ind. School
Dist., 509 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which held
that certain actions of the Board of Equalization (which was a replacement Board some
of whose members had been fired by the Trustees of the School Board), were not abso-
lutely void so as to be subject to collateral attack.
67. 501 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
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tial injury to him in dollars, but he must also allege and prove that such
omission was the result of a deliberate, arbitrary and fundamentally er-
roneous scheme adopted and imposed by the tax officials of the taxing
agency to permit the excluded classes of property to escape their fair
share of the tax burden .... 68
If the taxpayer does not commence suit until after the institution of the tax
plan, as was the case in Swamp Irish, his remedies are severely limited. He
must prove that the taxes levied upon his property are excessive, and after
this showing, he will only be entitled to recover the excess amount of taxes.6 9
C. Delinquent Tax Suits
An important decision was rendered by the Dallas court of civil appeals
in Collum v. Anderson.70  It appeared that in a suit to foreclose delinquent
taxes, personal service was not had upon Anderson, the owner of the real
estate. Rather, Anderson was cited by publication in accordance with Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 117a, § 3.71 After a default judgment was entered
by the trial court in favor of the state in the foreclosure proceedings, Collum
purchased this property at a tax sale. The trial court in Collum set aside
the foreclosure judgment and awarded Collum the purchase price of the prop-
erty at the foreclosure sale, which had been tendered into court by Anderson.
Since the action by Anderson was in the nature of a bill of review, the court
of civil appeals held that in order to set aside the judgment in the tax fore-
closure suit and the tax sale to Collum, Anderson had to plead and prove
a meritorious defense. The court held that Anderson's plea that payment
of the delinquent taxes would have been made if he had been personally
served was not a meritorious defense. Thus, the case was remanded for a
new trial.
In its remand the court of civil appeals suggested that possible meritorious
defenses could include the fact that the asserted taxes were not levied prop-
erly, the land was not subject to tax, or the taxes were not delinquent. In
the author's opinion, all of these considerations merely skirt the crux of the
controversy, i.e., whether service by publication on a landowner in a tax
delinquency suit is valid when, apparently, he could have been personally
served. 72 It is submitted that if Anderson was the record owner of the prop-
68. Id. at 692. For a discussion of the requirements for injunctive relief on the the-
ory that the taxpayer's property has been assessed at a higher percentage of true market
value than other classes of property on the tax rolls, see Lancaster Ind. School Dist.
v. Pinson, 510 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Cf. John-
son, Use of Injunctions in State Tax Cases, in 6 STATE BAR OF TEXAs, NEWSLETTER OF
THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 2, April 1973, at 1, discussing injunction suits brought
by the state.
69. City of Arlington v. Cannon, 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414 (1954).
70. 502 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ granted).
71. TEx. R. Civ. P. 117a, § 3 supercedes the prior provisions of ch. 18, § 1, [1939]
Tex. Laws 661. Kirkman v. City of Amarillo, 508 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ama-
rillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. The court alluded to the proper service argument in discussing possible meritori-
ous defenses by the following language:
If a tax judgment is obtained without proper service the property owner
may be deprived not only of his right to appear and defend the suit but
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erty, was living on the property, or his residence could have been easily ascer-
tained by the exercise of due diligence, the tax sale to Collum is void due
to the lack of proper service on Anderson in -the suit to foreclose delinquent
taxes. 73*
V. PROCEDURES AND MISCELLANEOUS TAXES
7 4
A. Hearings Division of Comptroller's Office
A recent attorney general opinion7 5 discussed the effect of both the Open
also may be deprived of his statutory right of redemption. If the Ander-
sons are able to plead and prove that without any fault or negligence on
their part they were deprived of their statutory right of redemption byjudgment taken against them without notice, together with any other cir-
cumstance, such as gross inadequacy of price, . . . and they tender into
court the amount required for such redemption, they might possibly be en-
titled to equitable relief permitting them to exercise their right of redemp-
tion beyond the two year period allowed by the statute.
502 S.W.2d at 602.
73. Scales v. Wren, 103 Tex. 304, 127 S.W. 164 (1910); Hume v. Carpenter, 188
S.W. 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1916, writ ref'd). See also State Mortgage Corp.
v. Traylor, 120 Tex. 148, 36 S.W.2d 440 (1931), and the authorities cited therein.
* Editor's Note: Since this Article went to press, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals. 514 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1974).
74. There were several decisions concerning various taxes, which are not of general
interest. Included in this category are Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1974)(fees imposed on bailbondsmen are regulatory in nature and are thus license fees as op-
posed to being occupation taxes illegally imposed without statutory authorization); Cal-
vert v. Zanes-Ewalt Warehouse, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1974) (statute providing for
the imposition of a tax on "first sale" of cigarettes and defining "first sale" to include
the loss or theft of cigarettes within this state is within the legislative taxing power and
does not offend the constitutional requirements of reasonableness and due process); Big
Country Club, Inc. v. Humphreys, 511 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (after assertion by taxing authority that additional liquor taxes are due,
private club has burden to show that formula used by state to calculate additional taxes
is unreasonable, excessive, capricious, or arbitrary. Merely introducing all records of
the club will not meet this burden); Barnett v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 510 S.W.2d
361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (claims adjusters found to be inde-
pendent contractors due to lack of control over their work product by the "employers,"
thus exempting the employer from contributing unemployment taxes based on their com-
pensation); Morrow v. State, 509 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ)(in a plea of privilege proceeding, defendants' argument that they were not "employers"
subject to unemployment taxes goes to the merits of the suit and is irrelevant for the
purposes of venue); Texas Vending Comm'n v. Headquarters Corp., 505 S.W.2d 402(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (The legislature delegated to the Texas
Vending Commission the right to refuse to issue or renew vending licenses under TEX.
TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 13.17, § 20(3) (1969) on the basis of a discretionary standard re-
lating to "the general welfare, health, peace, and safety of the people." Upon a trial
de novo of the commission's order, the court would be deciding matters of discretion dele-
gated to the commission by the legislature in contravention of TEX. CONST. art. II, §
1, and thus due to the nonseverability clause in § 25 of the Act relating to trials de
novo, the entire Act, except for the definition section, is void.); Space Precision Machin-
ing Co. v. Texas, 503 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (em-
ployer cannot receive lower contribution rate under Texas Unemployment Contribution
Act available after first four consecutive calendar quarters, when corporation was an
"employer" as defined in the Act, but had not been making contributions under the
Act); Lumbermen's Underwriters v. State Bd. of Ins., 502 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (a "classical" reciprocal insurance exchange whereby sub-
scribers mutually insure each other's property, the organization is non-profit, and sub-
scribers have a contingent liability for losses, is exempt from the gross premiums of TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7064 (1960)); Cannon Ball Truck Stop, Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 501 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(when a supplier pays state diesel fuel tax which it has failed to collect from a non-
bonded dealer, the supplier is subrogated to the rights of the state and its cause of action
against the dealer accrues on the date the tax is paid to the state); TEX. ATr'Y GEN.
Op. No. H-323 (1974) (a taxpayer is entitled to a refund of gas production taxes if
the Federal Power Commission establishes a rate lower than the contract price and re-
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Meetings Act76 and the Open Records Act77 on the disclosure of information
gathered during administrative proceedings held by the hearings division of
the comptroller's office. The purpose of these hearings is to afford the tax-
payer an opportunity to make an adjustment in a proposed tax deficiency78
or to request a refund or credit of a tax 79 without the necessity of commencing
litigation. It has been the policy of the comptroller's office to publish con-
densed statements of these hearings reflecting the basic facts and a statement
of the decision. It is not possible from a review of these rulings to ascer-
tain the identity of the taxpayer.
The Open Records Act makes public the information gathered by govern-
mental agencies in furtherance of their official business. An exception is pro-
vided in section 3(a)(1) of the Act for "information deemed confidential
by law, either Constitutional, statutory or by judicial decision . *.".."80 Since
article 1.031(1) expressly requires the comptroller not to disseminate specific
information about a taxpayer,8 ' the attorney general held that section
quires him to make a refund of the amount overcharged, even though he is permitted to
satisfy this obligation in a manner otherwise than by making a cash payment, e.g., a
gas exploration agreement with the customer); TEx. ATT'v GEN. Op. No. H-224 (1974)(15% of the Mixed Drink Beverage Clearance fund established from the 10% gross re-
ceipts tax on the sale of mixed beverages is owned by the cities and counties where the
tax originated and the comptroller must refund these amounts to appropriate recipient);
TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-209 (1974) (City of Temple may not use revenue collected
from the hotel occupancy tax to contract for operation of the Temple Cultural Activities
Center for the general culture enrichment of the populus, as such funds can be used only
for the statutory purposes, including the development of programs which directly relate
to the attraction of conventions and visitors to the city); TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-
176 (1973) (the term "market value" as used in TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 3.02(1)(1969) in computing the natural gas tax allows a deduction from taxable receipts of pay-
ments made by the purchaser for the purpose of reimbursing the producer for taxes.
The allowable deduction is for increases in the natural gas tax subsequent to the execu-
tion of the contract, but not for taxes in existence at the time the contract is signed);
TEx. Afr'y GEN. Op. No. H-172 (1973) (a "final determination" by the Federal Power
Commission of the rate on natural gas for the purposes of determining whether any re-
fund or credit is due the producer for natural gas taxes which it paid on the basis of
temporary rates occurs when the producer, the Federal Power Commission, and the pur-
chaser have agreed on the exact amount to be refunded); TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-
149 (1973) (the state is liable for federal airway use taxes imposed on the transportation
of state employees on state owned aircraft and for any interest due on unpaid taxes);
TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-124 (1973) (in determining the tax on shareholders of
a bank under TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7166 (1960), real estate held by a sub-
sidiary corporation or by a trustee, which could legally have been held in the bank's
name, cannot be deducted from the value of the stock). See also Pittsburg v. ALCO
Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974) (a 20% tax on the gross receipts from commercial
parking facilities is not an uncompenstated taking of property in violation of the due
process clause, when the tax puts some enterprises out of business, prevents others from
making a profit, and the taxing authority itself competes with private business by operat-
ing parking facilities); and Alexander v. Texaco, Inc., 482 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1973)
(a deed executed prior to the enactment of the Occupation Tax on Oil was construed
as not shifting the burden of that tax from the producer to the purchaser).
75. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-223 (1974).
76. TEx. RE. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Supp. 1974-75).
77. Id. at 6252-17a.
78. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.032 (1969); Comptroller's General Rule No. 3,
P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 65,715 (1972).
79. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. arts. 1.11, 1.11A (1969); Comptroller's Ruling No. 1.-
0.01, P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 65,702 .(1966); Comptroller's General Rule ,No. 3,
P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES 65,715 (1972).
80. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1) (Supp. 1974-75).
81. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.031(1) (1969) provides in part: 'The Comptroller
shall not make public or use said information derived in the course of said examination
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3(a)(1) excepts the results of proceedings in the hearings division and the
comptroller may not divulge this information.8 2 However, there is no such
prohibition on making public the names of those taxpayers who have
petitioned for a redetermination of tax or have filed a claim for refund.
In like manner, the attorney general held that the proceedings in the hear-
ings division were not "meetings" within the meaning of the Open Meetings
Act and, thus, need not be open to the public.83  Although there is no
exemption available in the Open Meetings Act, as in the Open Records Act,
for confidential information protected by statute, the comptroller could not
meet the requirements of article 1.031(1) if the hearings were open to the
public. In the author's opinion, the attorney general has reached the correct
result under both the Open Records Act and the Open Meetings Act.
B. Tax Liens
In State v. Gilbreth84 the State of Texas sought to recover delinquent ad-
missions taxes from the operator of a nightclub and also the landlord who
owned the property where the club was located. At the conclusion of the
state's evidence, the landlord moved for a summary judgment on the grounds
that the state had neither pleaded nor proved that notice of the tax lien on the
landlord's property had been filed in the county where the land was located,
as required by article 1.07,85 in effect prior to 1970. Both the trial court
and court of civil appeals upheld the landlord's motion, thus disallowing a
foreclosure of the tax lien against his property and dismissing him from the
suit. The decision makes clear that not only must the required notice be
filed in order to validly foreclose the state's lien, but also article 1.07 applies
to all tax liens created in title 122A, Taxation-General, whether they
specifically refer to article 1.07 or not.
A similar result was reached by the court in United States Fidelity & Guar-
of said books, records and papers and/or officers or employees except for the purpose
of a judicial proceeding for the collection of delinquent taxes in which the State of Texas
is a party."
82. In reporting decisions reached by the hearings division, presumably the comp-
troller will continue to publish the same condensed statement of facts and decisions.
The attorney general stated:
In his decisions he must discuss the principles of law applicable to the
factual situation in question without going into details which would make
identification possible. But as long as he confines himself to generalities,
and the identity of the individual taxpayer involved remains unknown, the
Comptroller may disclose the decisions he reaches without violating the
confidentiality provisions of Title 122A.
TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-223, at 4 (1974).
83. The attorney general reasoned that the proceedings in the hearings division con-
cerning the tax liability of a specific taxpayer was not a "deliberation between a quorum
of members of a governmental body at which any public business or policy . . . is dis-
cussed," id., and thus is not within TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § l(a)
(Supp. 1974-75) definition of a "meeting."
84. 511 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd).
85. At the time pertinent to this suit, art. 1.07(1) provided in part "[Before the
taxes provided for in this law shall become a lien on real estate, notice thereof must
be filed in the county where the real estate is located on which the lien is desired as




anty Co. v. Smith.86 In that case a surety paid motor fuel taxes due by a
distributor, thereby becoming subrogated to the rights of the state with
respect to these taxes. It appeared that the distributor, Daniel B. Smith,
d/b/a Forest-Dallas Oil Company, operated his business on property owned
by Ernest Duane Smith, Jr., an unrelated party. Since the state never filed
a notice claiming -a lien on the property of Ernest Duane Smith, Jr., for taxes
owed by Daniel B. Smith, no lien was perfected, so that United States Fidelity
& Guaranty could not foreclose the lien it had received by subrogation. Hav-
ing "stepped into the shoes" of the state, United States Fidelity & Guaranty
obtained only the rights possessed by the state. The obvious moral for
sureties and similarly situated persons is to verify that all actions prerequisite
to the establishment of a valid state tax lien have been complied with prior
to the payment of the delinquent taxes.
The Gilbreth and Smith cases are important only for the purposes of test-
ing these decisions against the provisions of article 1.07, as effective January
1, 1970. The main change in the statute relevant to this inquiry is article
1.07(1)(b), which provides in part: "As to the person liable for such
taxes the lien shall attach to all of his property as of the date the tax is due
and payable. '87 It would seem that subsequent to the amendment, the Smith
and Gilbreth cases would have been decided differently, since filing of the
notice is no longer a prerequisite to creation of the lien. 8  This conclusion
is buttressed by the new article 1.07(1)(c) which would seem to show that
the purpose of filing the notice is only to cut off persons acquiring a bona
fide interest in the taxpayer's property.89
C. Federal Taxes
Although it is not the purpose of the Survey to present an extended discus-
sion of federal tax cases, certain of these cases are of general interest, being
uniquely intertwined with the community property system or Texas law in
general. During the past Survey year, there were no noteworthy federal tax
cases meeting this criterion, although there were several decisions concerning
the taxable aspects of divorce settlements,"° availability of the exclusion
under section 911(a) of the Internal Revenue Code for foreign source
86. 512 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.07(1)(b) (1969) (emphasis added).
88. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
89. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.07(1)(c) (1969) provides:
No lien provided for by Title 122A shall be effective as against any
bona fide mortgagee, holder of a deed of trust, purchaser or judgment
creditor or any other person who for a bona fide consideration has ac-
quired a lien, title or other right or interest in any real estate or personal
property of the taxpayer prior to the filing, recording and indexing of such
lien in the county where real estate is situated, and for personal property,
in the county of the residence of the taxpayer at the time that said tax be-
came due and payable or in the county in which said taxpayer filed his re-
port.
90. Janus v. United States, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5241 (E.D. Cal. 1974);
A.J. Roberts, [1974] P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 175; Jean J. May, [1974] P-H Tax Ct. Mem.




income based on foreign community property law0 or laws of United States
community property states,92 effect of community property laws on the "inno-
cent spouse" rule,93 estate tax ramifications of the widow's election,9 4 estate
taxation in general, 95 and other miscellaneous matters. 96
91. Bottome v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Helen Robinson
Solano, 62 T.C. 562 (1974); Ramon R. Santigo, 61 T.C. 53 (1973).
92. Edward R. Fink, 60 T.C. 867 (1973).
93. Mary Lou Galliher, 62 T.C. 760 (1974); Jennie Allen, 61 T.C. 125 (1973).
94. Estate of Isabelle M. Sparling, 60 T.C. 330 (1973); Estate of Mose Sumner, 59
T.C. 837 (1973).
95. Estate of Fred R. Adams, [1974] P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 113; Rev. Rul. 74-312,
1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 26, at 15.
96. Spradley v. United States, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5038 (N.D. Tex. 1974);
Bowling v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 73-5899 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Rev. Rul.





AN INVITATION TO EMPLOYERS
The School of Law of Southern Methodist University invites attorneys,
firms, corporations, banking institutions, government agencies and other
prospective employers to use the Law School Placement Office to make
contact with its students and graduates.
PROCEDURE FOR INTERVIEWS
Employers who wish to Interview at the
School of Law during the coming year should
telephone or write the Placement Office as
far In advance as possible, giving preferred
and alternate dates. The telephone number
Is Area Code 214, 692-2622. The Placement
Office will reserve conference rooms at the
School, will supply resumes if the students
have prepared them, and will arrange for
overnight accommodations for the Interviewer,
If desired.
Interviews may be scheduled Mondays
through Fridays during the academic year, ex-
cept during examination periods. Many rep-
resentatives visit the School during the au-
tumn interview period. Therefore the reserva-
tion of autumn Interview dates should be ar-
ranged some months In advance.
Many members of the June graduating class
will have accepted employment by January
Ist.
EMPLOYERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SEND
DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR FIRMS AND ANY
OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION FOR STU-
DENTS TO READ PRIOR TO THE INTER-
VIEWS; our experience indicates that such
descriptions can sometimes materially in-
crease the student response for particular
openings. A file of firm resumes and job
descriptions Is maintained for student refer-
ence throughout the year.
PROCEDURE AND PLACEMENT
NOTICES
Employers who do not plan to send repre-
sentatives to the School but who wish to hire
new associates are Invited to mail or tele-
phone their job descriptions for posting on
the placement bulletin board. Information
about interested and qualified candidates
will be furnished by mail, and the candidates
will be invited to communicate directly with
the employer.
The Placement Office will not reveal a stu-
dent's or a graduate's rank in class or law
school average without the consent of the
student or graduate having first been ob-
tained.
The Placement Office will indicate to pro-
spective employers in which quintile of his
class an individual graduated or is currently
ranked.
FURTHER INQUIRY
The Law School Placement Office Invites
inquiries and suggestions relative to place-
ment. Please address correspondence to:
Placement Office
SMU School of Law
126 Storey Hall
Dallas, Texas 75275
